The Type-Token Distinction and the Mind and Brain Sciences by Griesel, Carsten
1  
The Type-Token Distinction and the Mind and Brain Sciences 
Carsten Griesel (grieselc@uni-mainz.de) 
Philosophisches Seminar, Johannes-Gutenberg Universität 
Jakob-Welder-Weg 18 
55099 Mainz, Germany 
2  
Abstract 
This paper is an analysis of scientific types – the categories of a scientific taxonomy. I argue 
that the philosophical view about mental types stands in contrast to the real nature of 
scientific types, which is in turn responsible for the mind-body problem. Since the view on 
the relation between psychology and neurology was broadened to the status about special 
sciences in general, my argument can also be applied to the general special science 
discussion. My picture of types being the result of categorizing tokens with respect to their 
micro structure is used to show how scientific practice makes multiple realizability 
implausible. 
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Introduction: The Nature of Scientific Types and the Mind-Body 
Problem 
The mind-body problem arises due to not knowing how terms denoting mental phenomena 
and terms denoting physical phenomena relate to each other. Many would perceive a detailed 
specification of how these terms relate to each other as an explanation of the mind and thus, 
several suggestions about the nature of this relation have been brought forward, including 
substance dualism (e.g. Popper and Eccles 1977), the identity theory (Feigl 1967; Place 
1956; Smart 1959), the supervenience (Kim 1989, 1994) and the emergence thesis (Broad 
1925) as well as the thesis of eliminative materialism (Churchland 1981). 
The argument of “multiple realizability” which was particularly put forward Jerry 
Fodor (1987) and Hillary Putnam (1960; 1967a; 1967b; 1967c) had a significant impact on 
shaping the understanding of the relation between mental terms and neurological terms. This 
argument did not only have an influence on the mind-body debate but on the attitude towards 
special sciences like psychology, sociology, etc. in general (Fodor 1974, 1991). The point 
that Fodor articulates in order to generalise this argument is that the special sciences use 
terms that can be regarded as “natural kinds” of the special sciences i.e. that they are 
generalised theoretical entities which do have their own theoretical value in the theories of 
these special sciences. Special sciences, Fodor claims, primarily intend to find such 
generalisations and these terms generalise over physical instantiations that do not necessarily 
have something in common and would thus not form a physical natural kind. 
The terms of interest for specifying the relation between the mind and the body are 
type terms. This is the case because type terms are supposed to denote natural kinds which 
reflect ontological facts. Furthermore, the generation of a type is exactly the generalisation at 
which theories aim. The interesting question is not only which kinds do exist but also what 
makes a token an instance of a certain type. It is exactly this last question on which I will try 
to shed some light on the next pages. To answer the question is thus to specify the relation 
between types and tokens in the context of the mind-body problem. 
Although the question does not seem to be discussed very often, it is an absolutely 
nontrivial question what a mental type is. Unfortunately, intuitions seem to suggest a 
misleading picture. The often held hypothesis of the privileged (or non observational) access 
to one’s own mental states is often taken to imply that one cannot be wrong about the types 
of mental state one experiences (Smart 1959, p. 152). It is my intention to show that the still 
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predominant picture of definite, sacrosanct (mental) types should be abandoned. It is clear 
that types based on the supposedly privileged introspection can only be types of a folk 
understanding of psychology and that is why I want to argue for the possibility that these can 
be changed by a deeper analysis.1 
With regard to the physical side of the mind-body problem, it seems almost too 
obvious to declare that brain states – as philosophers perceive them – should be regarded as 
neurological tokens. But this view has not been very popular either. The motivation for 
declaring brain states not as neurological tokens but as neurological types was grounded in 
the curiosity to learn something about mental phenomena like pain in general. Mental types 
were of interest and not something about a certain mental state, event or property. So 
theorists just needed a neurological type that could be connected with a mental type. 
By discussing the relation between tokens and types, the final aim is to contribute to 
the discussion about the relation between types of different disciplines. Thereby, my view 
about psychological type-terms and their origin as well as my view about neurological types 
stands in some disagreement with the classical philosophical picture 
The relation between Types and Tokens 
Because there seem to be definite convictions about how the mental types, which have to be 
reductively explained, really look like, the favoured procedure seems to be to keep the 
extension of the type fixed while investigating the reduction base. This is probably due to the 
direct “givenness” of phenomena like pain. Though I do not want to deny that people are 
experiencing types of pain, the pain-type is certainly not directly given, meaning that there is 
no a priori understanding of type terms like pain. Special sciences like psychology deal with 
macroscopic descriptions and consequently we should not expect the types of psychology to 
be indefeasible “brute facts” – i.e. that these types just exist “out there”, independently from 
any instantiations or definitions. 
Instead, types are classifications of the tokens which at the same time should reflect 
natural kinds in that there exist differences between the tokens that make the classification of 
the tokens reflect a fact. And if e.g. pain is a natural kind of psychology, then this type term 
of mental phenomenon is already a generalisation – a subsumption of what is essential for a 
token to be of this type. There is a very important point behind this insight, which is 
                                                 
1 A very similar point, with which I am very sympathetic too, is brought forward by Bechtel and McCauley 
(1999). 
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demonstrated by Michael Pauen (2000, p. 399) who refers to Robert W. Batterman (2000): 
“…not all causal properties which can be observed on the microphysical level are relevant 
for type generation on higher levels.”2 Consequently, the type term’s extension depends on 
the level of abstraction from the micro level properties of the tokens and the abstraction level 
determines how coarsely or finely grained the type will classify the tokens. Thereby the 
properties of a set of tokens to make up a type do not only rely on superficial properties of 
the tokens but also on their micro level structure. As a consequence of all this, the intuition 
of having a clearly defined picture about the types under investigation for which one simply 
has to decide if a certain token is an instance of that type seems to be more and more 
implausible. Eventually, the type under investigation might change due to new insights about 
the reduction base.3 
When I said that phenomena like pain are thought to be directly given – whatever this 
means – it is clear that what is directly given can only be an instance of e.g. a pain 
experience and not a type of pain. Why then does it seem likely that even somebody who 
experiences a mental state or event for the first time will readily engage in type-talk about 
what he has experienced? It is because an abstraction or concept of a certain mental state or 
event can already be generated from only one instance which names the reason why 
obviously everybody believes to know what the types of mental phenomena are. This is the 
same with mental types as with all other types. To emphasise the picture of types being post 
hoc entities, generated from a collection of tokens, let me review the prime example of 
taxonomy: The taxonomy of species. 
Type Generation Exemplarily Demonstrated in Biology 
Types are the result of taxonomy generation. It is most basic to all sciences to bring the 
objects of investigation of the respective science in some order (Fodor 1974, p. 101). The 
claim that physical realisations might not need to have interesting commonalities to make up 
a special science type implies that the ascertainment of such unfamiliarity of the 
microstructure entities would not influence the type under investigation. The claim of 
interesting cases of multiple realizability is thus that types are resistant to the insight that 
there is no underlying “natural kind” on the microlevel. This claim seems to be especially 
                                                 
2 Translated from German by myself. 
3 Actually, this process can also be regarded as a “moderate elimination” which might not be too far away from 
recent accounts of Patricia Smith Churchland (2002). 
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prominent when investigating psychological types. As “interesting cases”, I regard cases 
where the realisations do not have something essential in common. Surely, every object is 
multiple realizable in that the exact atomic structure will not be exactly the same. This 
though, is neither the case the multiple realizability argument wants to attack nor is it 
something anybody would wonder about (Pauen 2000). 
Naturally, the most obvious properties are consulted when starting to generate a 
taxonomy of life-forms. Such properties might be “has legs”, “swims under water”, “flies”, 
“eats plants” and so on. The properties chosen to distinguish individuals will certainly 
depend on the life-form tokens one has encountered so far. As a consequence of such 
obvious discrimination criteria, it is not surprising that whales and dolphins were indeed part 
of the proto-taxon “fish”, while penguins were not part of the proto-taxon “bird”. Of course 
this does not mean that these categories were scientifically useless, since they were 
necessary starting points of the investigation. However, it does not mean that the proto-taxa 
are in any way sacrosanct either. What has happened when one of our ancestors who used 
the proto-taxon of “fish” realized that some of these “fish” have characteristics that are more 
similar to animals that he had classified as non-“fish” while all other “fish” share another 
common characteristic that the strange “fish” do not? He will certainly not have thought: 
“Oh, there are no fish.” Instead, he could have adopted a stance popular with some of 
today’s philosophers: While adhering to the original “fish” type, one acknowledges that all 
animals swimming under water do not share a common essential characteristic except from 
swimming under water. Hence our ancestor might have claimed that membership to the 
“fish” type is irreducible. After all, the essential property of swimming under water is 
multiple realizable. 
Another possibility would be to invent new sub categories of “fish”. This looks like a 
good approach when one still thinks that swimming under water is the only (or most) 
essential criterion for being a fish. The trouble is that the strange “fish” have characteristics 
that seem to be essential for other animals, while no other animals have the characteristics of 
the normal “fish”. This favours the strange “fish” to be excluded from the “fish” category 
which becomes afterwards more a fish category and thus changes in its extension. The type 
“fish” has thus changed over time. This is based on the fact that people have changed their 
opinion on what is essential for being fish on the basis of characteristics on a lower, finer 
detailed description level. 
The same process can repeat itself when one investigates the microstructure even 
further and analyses e.g. the DNA. In biology, as in the other sciences, the possibilities to 
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investigate even deeper microstructure organisations are most often paired with a 
controversy. The controversy is then about whether one should continue to categorise on 
higher level characteristics or should use the categories of an underlying description level. 
This happens when the deeper analysis reveals that actually two or more quite differently 
organised types have been grouped in one. 
This enables us to reply to Fodor’s claim that special science types bundle 
instantiations that do not have interesting commonalities on the lower level description 
(Fodor 1974). If this were true, it only shows a special science type is not a natural kind 
either and thus the discrepancy in micro level properties will also show a discrepancy in 
macro level properties. In other words: If there is no underlying natural kind for a special 
science type, meaning that this type is a disjunction of natural kinds, the macro level type 
will also be a disjunction of macro level natural kinds. 
From this we learn that it can frequently change over time whether a certain token is 
part of a certain type. One might object that the original folk taxonomies have not changed 
but simply do coexist with the different scientific taxonomies. This is the reason why I chose 
the obvious example of fish, in which the folk understanding of what it means to be fish 
changed due to scientific progress as well. Though there seems to be a huge time lag 
between changes in folk and scientific taxonomy, folk taxonomy is not definite either. The 
same holds for folk psychology. 
Natural Kinds of Psychology and Neurology 
My main point in the last section was that we should not expect to have a clearly defined, 
incontrovertible type at hand when we use terms such as pain. This was because the 
extension of terms like pain depends on what we think is essential for a mental phenomenon 
while exactly the microstructure‘s revelation of a bundle of tokens that are supposed to be 
subsumed by that type is likely to change the notion about what is essential. Our first 
problem in the quest for psychophysical identities is thus the “slipperiness” of mental 
vocabulary. The second problem – whose solution would have repercussions for the first 
problem – is the misleading impression that philosophers have a neurological type (or at 
least an idea of one) available that could be used on the physical side with which to identify 
mental terms. In today’s discussion “C-Fibre activation” is – though most often used – 
merely a placeholder for whatever neurological type there might be. I see a problem in using 
this placeholder since it seems to somehow shape philosophers imagination about how a 
neurological type could look like. What is right about the C-Fibre example is that this type 
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would at least be a type defined by neurological criteria, namely localisation and more 
important, histology – C-Fibres are supposed to be neurons that have their function because 
of the properties they have. Though localisation and histology are important differentiation 
criteria when “decomposing” the brain, these criteria are not very suitable candidates for 
constituting the kinds of types we are looking for since it is extremely unlikely that the 
information processed in the brain is coded (solely) by localisation and cell architecture. 
So what is it that has to be done to solve the mind-body problem? Besides of the 
readiness to revise psychological types, a suitable neurological kind with the correct degree 
of granularity is needed. Neuroscientists become more and more aware of what are the 
crucial properties of neural activity and from what properties it has to be abstracted (e.g. 
Elger et al. 2004). Finally a granularity has to be reached, which allows answering the 
question for what makes a neurological token a token with a certain content. 
Could Fodor under these circumstances, as he is doing it in the original Special 
Science article (Fodor 1974) really deny that neuroscience criteria could be found which 
naturally group the tokens in the way that they resemble the grouping of the mental tokens?. 
If one grants, as Fodor and most other do, a token identity, than scientific practise secures 
that mental tokens are classified by type terms in the same way as neurological types classify 
neurological tokens. If we could record brain states with the appropriate granularity, only a 
dualistic position would allow for the claim that the neurological tokens present when one is 
in pain do not have something in common. What we need is a measure of similarity to 
compare and classify neural activity with the suitable granularity. Then it will definitely 
show that the type terms of the more basic science allow for same degree of between token 
differences as the types of a more general discipline (also see Bechtel and Mundale 1999). If 
there is still a mismatch, we should not be too surprised. Eventually, our intuitive taxonomy 
of mental types might turn out to be inaccurate. 
Conclusion: Hope for a Reductive Explanation of Special Science 
Types 
The aim of this paper was to demonstrate that it might be a misconception of what types are 
and how types come about, that might be responsible for part of the mind-body problem. I 
tried to argue that types understood as post hoc structures over bundles of tokens would 
overcome this problem. 
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The multiple realizability argument builds upon a mismatch of the level of 
abstraction from unimportant properties in psychology and neurology. The same argument 
can be made about the status of special sciences in general: I argue that there is no reason 
why no criteria should be found that result in a one to one mapping of types when an identity 
of tokens of two disciplines is granted. But maybe even more important is what would 
happen if there are still mismatches in the way that the tokens on the neural level make it 
possible to differentiate between types that on the mental level are all classified as one type: 
then we would have good reason to differentiate between the mental tokens that project to 
different subtypes on the neural level too. In other words, if there is reason to believe that on 
one level the natural kinds are finer grained, then there will be a way of discovering slight 
differences of subtypes on the other level as well. 
Finally, the practise of scientific taxonomy secures that types for which no accordant 
lower level natural kind can be found (e.g. by trying out different degrees of abstraction), 
will finally be changed themselves. 
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